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In recent years, we have witnessed three parallel and intertwined trends:  First, food retail 
and processing firms have embraced private standards, usually with some form of third 
party certification employed to verify adherence to those standards.  Second, firms have 
aligned themselves increasingly aligned themselves with, as opposed to fighting off, 
environmental, fair trade, and other NGOs.  Third, firms have embraced supply chain 
management as a strategy for increasing profits and market share.  Together, these trends 
are part and parcel of the neoliberal blurring of the older liberal distinction between state 
and civil society.  In this paper I ask what the implications of these changes are from the 
vantage point of the three major approaches to ethics: consequentalism, virtue theory, and 
rights theory.  What are the consequences of these changes for food safety, for suppliers, 
for consumers?  What virtues (e.g., trust, fairness) are these changes likely to embrace 
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In recent years, we have witnessed three parallel and intertwined trends:  First, food retail 
and processing firms have embraced private standards, usually with some form of third 
party certification employed to verify adherence to those standards.  For example, many 
supermarket chains have joined GlobalGAP (2008) (previously known as EurepGAP), an 
association designed to create and implement common private food safety, 
environmental, and worker health and safety standards among its members.  Farms must 
engage an approved third party certifier to audit for compliance to the standards.  
Similarly, CIES (2002) has established a Global Food Safety Initiative in an attempt to 
create a common benchmark for food safety globally.   
 
Second, firms have increasingly aligned themselves with, as opposed to fighting off, 
environmental, fair trade, and other NGOs.  Put differently, firms have begun to 
understand that NGOs are the new superbrands, able to mobilize a small but highly 
influential segment of the public that is strongly concerned about farm worker health and 
safety, animal welfare, environmental degradation, local sourcing, organic production, or 
some other issue (Wootliff and Deri 2001).  Given the rather low profit margins in both 
food processing and retailing, firms can ill afford the adverse publicity associated with 
NGO campaigns.  In contrast, they are happy to have the support – and free advertising – 
that NGOs can bring them. 
 
Third, firms have embraced supply chain management as a strategy for increasing profits 
and market share.  Until about twenty years ago, food processing and especially food 
retailing was a rather inefficient sector of the economy.  Food processors depended on 
consumer recognition of their brand names, while retailers purchased whatever 
processors concocted, bringing it in through the back door and moving it out through the 
front door.  Initially, given the small size of most retailers and the much larger size and 
visibility of the processors, retailers had little choice.  But even after the creation of the 
first wave of large supermarket chains, the business model remained largely unchanged. 
 
This all shifted with the creation of a new wave of retailers who were determined to 
reorganize the retail business so as to increase its profitability.  The watchword for food 
retailing became ‘efficient consumer response,’ an approach that emphasized adapting 
techniques developed in manufacturing to food retailing (Brown 1997; Caswell, Bredahl 
and Hooker 1998).  Hence, companies such as Wal-Mart, Carrefour, and Aldi began to 
shift from individual store management to supply chain management.  Put differently, 
executives at these chains began to see that they were sufficiently large that they could 
think of their stores as the end of a long and complex pipeline through which many goods 
might flow and act accordingly.  Moreover, they could dominate those supply chains, 
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dictating to suppliers a variety of quality characteristics of food products, timing of 
deliveries, and stocking of shelves.  Indeed, they could coordinate vertically such that 
package size and shape, brand labels, organoleptic qualities, and supplier business models 
were all influenced or even controlled by the supermarkets (Busch 2007) 
 
Together, these trends are part and parcel of the neoliberal blurring of the older liberal 
distinction between state and civil society (Friedman 1962; Hayek 1973; 1976; 1979).  In 
their quest to limit the power of the nation-state proponents of neoliberalism have worked 
hard for more than a half century to reduce state regulation of markets, create 
international institutions that limit state power, and whenever possible employ markets as 
distributive systems.  In so doing, they have opened the door to the creation of private 
governance systems such as those described here.1 
 
State power is backed up by state sanctions, e.g., violation of food safety laws may be 
punishable by payment of a fine, time in prison, and/or forced closure of a business.  In 
contrast, private power is backed up by market sanctions, e.g., removal from a given 
market.  Hence, the shift from government to governance is best understood as (1) an 
enhancement of the ability of certain firms to dominate supply chains, reducing costs by 
imposing a new form of discipline on other (usually upstream) firms in the chain, and (2) 
the realization by NGOs of their potential to pressure the dominant firms. 
 
In this paper I ask what the ethical implications of these changes are.  In representative 
democracies the state is the final arbiter of many critical moral and ethical issues.  
Elected legislative bodies are charged with creating uniform laws that are to be uniformly 
enforced across some defined territory.  Clearly, critics of state power rightly argue that 
(even democratic) states can be quite oppressive in their actions (Constant 1988; Scott 
1998).   Yet, as this paper attempts to make clear, private governance structures pose an 
analogous, and perhaps more intractable, set of problems.   
 
A central feature of private governance is an expanded role for the market.  The modern 
market2 is, virtually by definition, based on a particular interpretation of commutative 
justice.  The principle of commutative justice asserts that, if the parties are uncoerced, 
there is an equivalence between two articles exchanged; hence, the exchange is said to be 
just.  From this was derived the medieval term ‘just price,’ which referred to a price fixed 
by a third party as fair and just based on the labor required to produce a given item.  
However, in modern markets, that equivalence is based on the so-called laws of supply 
and demand, or in other words, scarcity is explicitly included in the calculation.  Thus, 
equivalence is presumed to exist when a monetary exchange takes place; the power 
relationship – what Samuels (2004) calls a ‘structure of mutual coercion’ – often found in 
the market is excluded from the analysis (or at least from the view of the some 
economists and often from the view of participants).   
                                                 
1
 Curiously, it appears that the major proponents of neoliberalism did not foresee the rise of private 
governance institutions, including standards, certifications, and accreditations. 
2
 E. P. Thompson (1963; 1971) noted some years ago that pre-modern markets developed in the context of 
a moral economy, i.e., a means for grappling with issues of distributive justice.  The creation of capitalist 
markets involved a long struggle to eliminate these distributive mechanisms. 
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Yet, as Ayres suggests,  
 
It simply is not true that scarce resources are allocated among alternative uses by 
the market. The real determinant of whatever allocation occurs in any society is 
the organizational structure of that society – in short, its institutions. At most, the 
market only gives effect to prevailing institutions (quoted in Samuels 2004, 364). 
 
It is precisely because mainstream economics largely avoids discussion of how markets 
come to be structured in particular ways that concerns about equitable exchange have 
arisen. 
 
This suggests, in turn, that there are two conceptually different critiques of private 
systems of governance.  The first emerges from a concern that commutative justice is not 
obtained through existing markets because of the unequal power of the participants to 
alter the structure of the exchange.  The second, and more profound critique, argues that 
attention paid to commutative justice to the exclusion of distributive justice is 
unacceptable.  The former argument suggests tinkering with the structure of the 
marketplace, but accepts the notion that the market is the proper mechanism for handling 
the problem posed.  The latter position argues that other non-market institutions must 




Philosophers generally acknowledge three major approaches to ethics: consequentalism, 
virtue theory, and rights theory.  While purists may insist that one approach is invariably 
better than the others for the resolution of all ethical problems, I make no such claim 
here.  In fact, quite to the contrary, I argue that each approach asks a different set of 
questions and thereby reveals a different aspect of the issues at hand.  Hence, from a 
consequentialist perspective one may ask: What are the consequences of these changes 
for food safety, for consumers, and for suppliers?  From a virtue ethics perspective one 
may ask: What virtues (e.g., trust, fairness) are these changes likely to embrace and what 
vices may accompany them?  And, finally, from the perspective of rights theory one may 
ask:  Whose rights will be furthered or curtailed by these changes?  While space does not 





Multiple tiers of safety.  We take for granted when we enter any shop that goods will vary 
in price and qualities.  If I wish to buy chocolate, I may buy a very cheap type containing 
relatively little cocoa, or an expensive type containing mostly cocoa.  Prices are likely to 
vary accordingly.  The same will apply for virtually any food product I buy.  In contrast, 
when I purchase a food product at any supermarket in any industrialized nation, I am 
confident that it has quite likely passed all the necessary tests of safety.  This was not 
 - 4 - 
always the case.  As Stanziani (2005) has noted, prior to the late nineteenth century, food 
safety was in the hands of the buyer.  Caveat emptor was the order of the day. 
 
But the shift to private governance of food raises the possibility of a shift in food safety 
from a single standard to one that has multiple tiers, e.g., barely safe, safe enough, very 
safe.  Under such a system of governance, food safety would become a matter of market 
affordability rather than of general protection of the public by the state.  Indeed, 
unwittingly, and perhaps only temporarily, the Chinese system for food safety is already 
a three tier system with organic food, ‘green food’ (certified as using agrochemicals 
within safe limits), and everything else.  While the Chinese appear to see this as a 
temporary measure, on the way to a single uniform standard of safety, it could easily 
evolve into a permanent three tier system. 
 
Moreover, in a somewhat paradoxical manner, the recent efforts on the part of CIES 
(2002) to develop a single, global benchmark for food safety, may actually encourage the 
creation of multiple tiers.  On the one hand, CIES’s actions are clearly raising the bar on 
food safety, since the benchmarked standards appear to satisfy the food safety agencies of 
numerous nations.  On the other hand, such benchmarking is not cost-free and might well 
spur the creation of another, weaker standard. 
 
For consumers.  Consequences for (many) consumers may actually be quite positive.  
Worldwide, the presence of supermarkets is growing, and they are no longer reserved for 
the wealthy and middle classes (Dries, Reardon and Swinnen 2004; Reardon et al. 2003; 
Weatherspoon and Reardon 2003).  Indeed, because supermarkets can reorganize supply 
chains, and because they often operate under conditions of acute competition among 
themselves, supermarkets can and do offer consumers lower prices, better quality, greater 
variety, and safer food than they might have purchased in open-air wet markets or small 
family-owned grocery stores.  However, consumers may find that they need to travel 
further to purchase food.  Furthermore, supermarkets may promote foods that are higher 
in fat and sugar than traditional diets, thereby contributing to the worldwide concerns 
about obesity. 
 
For suppliers including farmers and farm workers.  The private governance of food poses 
several major although largely unintended consequences for farmers and farm workers.  
Let us first examine the situation for farmers.  On the one hand, farmers who are able to 
become certified to supermarket standards are likely to find themselves in long term 
relations with buyers.  This may result in lower prices for goods sold in some years, but it 
will likely also result in more stable prices as farmers will be able to put far more of their 
production under contract (Busch et al. 2005).  At the same time, however, such farmers 
will find themselves in direct competition with other farmers growing the same crops or 
livestock in other parts of the world.  Farmers’ only means of protecting themselves from 
this will be through the continuous development of new niche markets for particular 
products (e.g., new varieties of fruit), or by taking advantage of the seasonality of 
production.3   
 
                                                 
3
 Chile has built its entire fruit industry on this counterseasonal  production. 
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On the other hand, farmers who – for whatever reason – fail to meet supermarket 
standards will likely be forced into a declining market segment in which prices received 
are lower, markets are more volatile, and quality premiums are extremely variable.  
Likely, many of these farmers will move to the ever-burgeoning cities where they will 
add to urban slums. 
 
For farm workers the situation is likely to be far more serious, but equally bifurcated.  
Given the downward pricing pressure put on farmers by supermarkets – either directly 
through contracts, or indirectly through farmer competition – all farmers are likely to 
press for low wages and/or replace farm workers with machinery.  Beyond that, it appears 
that a two tier system is developing whereby provisions for full time workers are 
reasonably good as a result of certification requirements – this would include a variety of 
things from protective clothing for use in spraying pesticides, to provision of toilets and 
cafeterias – while part time and temporary workers are poorly paid and exposed to 
pesticides – (see, for example, Bain 2007). 
 
That said, I see no reason to make the world safe for poverty.  A decline in the number of 
persons on small farms, and a similar decline in the number of farm workers is far more 
problematic if they wind up unemployed in the slums, bidonvilles, barrios, than if they 
find jobs elsewhere in the economy at higher wages.  Unfortunately, this rarely happens; 
instead slum populations are growing faster than the general population and now include 




Trust.  Perhaps the key virtue that is transformed by the restructuring of the food system 
is trust.  We may consider trust as consisting of two interrelated parts (Beekman 2004).  
First, there is trust in persons.  This sort of trust, which must at least initially be displayed 
in face to face settings, is dialogical.  This dialogue includes exchange of words, but it is 
also an exchange of gestures (Mead 1962), and of things (Latour 1987).  Moreover, as 
Goffman (1993) has suggested, face is also dialogical.   
 
Consider how this plays out in everyday life.  Those persons around me are trusted to 
varying degrees based on my experiences with them.  Someone who appears trustworthy 
is someone on whom I can rely.  For example, I may trust the local butcher to provide me 
with cuts of meat that meet my desires.  But he may also trust me, by offering to sell on 
credit, trusting that I will indeed pay the debt within a reasonable period of time.  
Importantly, this form of trust goes far beyond dependability; it includes the ability to 
extend trust to new kinds of relationships.   
 
But our everyday understanding of trust goes yet further, incorporating our relationships 
with things.  This is certainly true of simple tools which we come to know as our own to 
such a degree that they become extensions of our bodies (Idhe 1979; Idhe 1990).  Dental 
tools and hammers are excellent examples of this kind of trust.  Nor does it stop there.  
Automobiles become extensions of one’s body, such that an experienced driver knows 
when the actions of a vehicle are ‘abnormal.’  These relations, although far less rich than 
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those with fellow humans, are also dialogical.  We come to communicate with and 
through these objects.  We come to ‘know’ these objects as having certain properties, and 
performing faithfully certain actions.  But, unlike the trust we place in other humans, trust 
in objects is generally understood solely as dependability.4  Nevertheless, dialogue, I 
submit, is essential to both of these everyday understandings of trust.   
 
In contrast, the trust that is created through conformity assessment is quite different in 
that it is essentially monological.  Indeed, some would not call it trust at all, but rather a 
poor substitute for it.  In each instance, the person or thing that is certified to meet a given 
set of standards that appears to us as largely opaque.  We are typically confronted by a 
logo, a seal, a certificate, that proclaims conformity to some (often hidden and sometimes 
secret) set of standards.  We are normally neither a party to the determination of those 
standards, nor do we know the details of the contents of the standards, nor are we party to 
the certification of a person or thing to those standards, or to the accreditation of the 
certifying body.  And, we must either blindly trust in the logo or seal (and what appears 
to stand behind it) or flatly reject it.   
 
Importantly, even if we trust the certified person or object in this limited monological 
sense, we must later convert it – through experience – into dialogical trust.  But this is not 
a matter of learning what the standards are, how the certification was conducted, or how 
the accreditation agency works.  It is a matter of converting, translating, reshaping the 
monological trust in the logo into personal experience and dialogue with the certified 
person or thing.  Put differently, even operating in its most effective manner, the trust that 
emerges out of conformity assessment is and must be impoverished.  As such, living in a 
world in which all forms of trust are monological would be nearly intolerable as it would 
replace the richness of dialogue and experience with a focus on the surface 
characteristics. 
 
Fairness.  Fairness is commonly claimed by proponents of certain certifications (e.g., 
fair-trade certifications).  But, as with trust, claims to fairness are and must remain 
problematic for many of the same reasons.  In everyday situations fairness is something 
that we claim or deny for particular situations.  We note that certain exchanges are unfair, 
while others are fair.  But in the case of fair-trade and like certifications, we must accept 
the decision made by some unknown person or persons as to the fairness of the exchange 
that is likely made somewhere far removed from where we are .  This is not to suggest 
that the persons determining that an exchange is fair are in any way attempting either to 
force their views on us or to conceal what are in fact unfair practices.  Rather, we are 
likely unfamiliar with the formal criteria employed, nor do we fully understand how they 
are employed.  We must accept on faith that those doing the certifying have an 
understanding of fairness that is similar to our own.   
 
Doubtless, other virtues such as honesty and integrity are displayed differently in systems 
of private governance.  But I shall leave to others the task of examining those differences.  
Let us now turn to rights. 
                                                 
4
 Beekman (2004) argues that humans may also be trusted in this way, where trust is viewed as consistent – 
but not necessarily desirable – behavior. 




To manage one’s own affairs.  Conformity assessments can and often do challenge the 
rights of persons to manage their own affairs.  Consider a 1905 contract for the 
production of tomatoes in New Jersey, reproduced in its entirety: 
 
This is to certify that we ___ have bought of ___ the product of ___ acres of 
tomatoes for the season of ___ at $___ per ton, delivered at our cannery at ___.  
Stock to be in first-class mercantile condition,  To be planted about ___ (Corbett 
1905). 
 
To readers a century later, it is astonishing for what it does not include.  Similar contracts 
today would not only specify just what is meant by ‘first-class mercantile condition;’ they 
would likely also include one or more certifications.  These certifications would focus on 
myriad other details about planting, spacing, farm worker housing conditions, availability 
of toilets, use of pesticides and other farm chemicals, etc.  Thus, one aspect of 
certifications is that they often impose considerable constraints on the actions of upstream 
actors.  (GlobalGAP has a wide range of major and minor musts.  Growers are required to 
meet 100% of the major musts and 95% of the minor musts.)  And, while it is true that 
certifications are voluntary, they are often de facto mandatory.  Nor is the problem 
limited to standards promulgated by companies.  NGOs, despite having often the very 
best of intentions, may make equally strong demands on upstream actors (Gereffi, 
Garcia-Johnson and Sasser 2001). 
 
To Redress of Grievances.  Moreover, of particular concern is that these new forms of 
private governance rarely if ever have anything even vaguely resembling an appeals 
process or a separation of powers.  In general, once one fails to comply with the 
standards, as evidenced by failure to become or remain certified, there is little that one 
can do about it.  And, even if appeals are permitted, they are usually appeals to the same 
persons or organizations that rejected the action in the first place.  An analogy would be 
an appeal by a serf to a medieval lord over the lord’s actions.  Of course, it might be 
argued that the serf was bound to the land and hence could not go elsewhere.  However, 
while in principle supply chain linkages are voluntary, they are often de facto mandatory, 
either in the sense that no other options exist or that other options involve considerable 
losses. 
 
The right to choose.  It would seem that the new system of private governance enhances 
consumers’ right to choose.  After all, it creates markets in which there is a seemingly 
endless array of products, both fresh and processed.  In the supermarket in my hometown, 
I can now buy certified fair trade coffee, free range eggs, organic carrots, and sustainably 
harvested fish.  I am confident that I will soon be able to choose foods that minimize 
carbon emissions.  And, I can choose among foods produced in dozens of nations.   
Nor is this unique to the industrial world.  In China, India, Kenya, Guatemala one sees a 
similar growth in the diversity of products found on the shelves.  Without a doubt, the 
range of food choices available to many people has grown exponentially in the last 
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several decades and it appears to continue to expand.  But at the same time, the drive to 
private governance tends to turn choice into a burden.  Consider that, in addition to price 
and quality considerations, coffee may be certified for organic, fair trade, bird friendly, 
shade grown, protective of biodiversity, region of origin, and/or kosher!  Which, if any, 
of these certifications should I choose?  Can any consumer be expected to make the 
myriad ethical and moral choices now demanded in the supermarket?  Empirical 
evidence and personal experience suggest that, since shoppers are nearly always pressed 
for time, they tend to buy those items with which they are most familiar and that few if 
any consumers ponder the information on the labels of all the products they purchase. 
 
In sum, private governance of food poses a number of ethical issues, regardless of the 
ethical perspective one takes on it.  So what can we conclude? 
 
Conclusions: Equitable Exchange or Bizarre Bazaar? 
 
One may argue that state intervention in the form of law shares many of the problems 
described above.  However, let me suggest that legal frameworks differ from conformity 
assessment in at least three important ways:  First, legal frameworks are homogeneous 
across some defined area of territory.  In general, one does not choose which laws to 
follow, or when to follow them.  In contrast, it is commonplace to have multiple systems 
of conformity assessment, some of which overlap and others of which are contradictory. 
 
Second, laws (with a few exceptions) remain valid only within national borders.  In 
contrast, certifications commonly extend far beyond national borders; hence, downstream 
expectations may well conflict with expectations upstream.  For example, Hatanaka 
(2006) found that shrimp farmers in one region of Indonesia found organic certification 
requirements imposed by foreign buyers to be problematic in several respects, given local 
knowledge and conditions. 
 
Third, laws often provide severe sanctions for violations, but they are very rarely 
specified at the level of detail as are conformity assessments.  Hence, laws provide 
multiple ways of achieving (or avoiding) the same results.  Paradoxically, although laws 
provide no escape clause from state sanctions, certifications are often more restrictive of 
personal liberties. 
 
This brings us back to the two very different critiques of private systems of governance.  
Nearly all NGO-led interventions into such governance systems are focused on rectifying 
what is perceived as the unequal power of the participants in the exchange relationship.  
This is certainly the case for NGOs concerned about the treatment of farmers and farm 
workers.  There are many examples of success in these endeavors.  For example, a recent 
analysis concluded that fair trade now accounts for €1000 million per annum (Eyre 
2008).  The same may be said about those NGOs concerned about other non-human 
actors such as forests, fish, animals, and ‘the environment.’  In contrast, relatively few 
NGOs have adhered to the more profound critique, demanding a reworking of the 
institutions that govern trade such that issues of distributive justice are taken more 
seriously as well as demanding more state intervention in the form of new laws.    
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In short, the reader looking for a simple answer to this question will be disappointed by 
my conclusions.  For while the private governance of food permits and even stimulates 
some forms of (more) equitable exchange, it also creates a bizarre bazaar where goods 
are differentiated by a growing and often bewildering array of criteria, most of which are 
only made visible to consumers through certifications.  This dual process simultaneously 
(1) addresses some of the worst excesses of the food system even as it largely avoids state 
intervention and reform of global institutions, and (2) provides greater choice to 
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